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CANONS 28 AND 29-AN APPRAISAL
HENRY S. DRINKER*

How far should Canons 28 and 29 of the ABA's Canons of Ethics
deter a lawyer from taking or participating in proceedings against a
fellow-lawyer in a matter involving the propriety of his professional
conduct, by reason of the fact that such proceedings may injure such
lawyer's professional reputation.
The Canons do not clearly or fully cover this problem.
Canon 29 is as follows:
Canon 29. Upholding the Honor of the Profession
Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper
tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and should
accept without hesitation employment against a member of the Bar who
has wronged his client. The counsel upon the trial of a cause in which
perjury has been committed owe it to the profession and to the public to
bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. The
lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either
moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not
only the law but the administration of justice.
This Canon is reasonably clear but of limited application.
"Fear" in the first sentence I think means apprehension of harm
which may happen to the discloser as a result of the disclosure
and not of what may happen to the other lawyer. The first clause
of the first sentence covers only conduct which is "corrupt or dishonest" and apparently not that which is the result merely of
ignorance, carelessness or stupidity. Its last clause, requiring the
lawyer unhesitatingly to accept employment against a lawyer who
has "wronged his client," apparently would require the lawyer,
before accepting a case against another lawyer, to satisfy himself
that the other has in fact wronged his client. Despite the words
"without hesitation" this would seem to me to contemplate that,
with his client's permission, he should call on the lawyer, state
the situation to him frankly, and give him an opportunity to explain
it and to justify himself. Should the client not be willing for him
to do this, I think he may properly decline to take the case. By
means of such interview and of a further investigation of facts
therein disclosed, it should, in most cases, be possible for the lawyer
to make up his mind whether the other has "wronged his client"
by "corrupt or dishonest conduct." Unless he is reasonably satisfied
* Member, Drinker, Biddle and Reath, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. For
further discussion of ethical problems involved in malpractice litigation, see
Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, supra p. 535 at
542.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 12

that such is the case I do not think that the Canon requires the
lawyer to go on with the case if he does not wish to do so.
The attitude of a lawyer asked to proceed against another lawyer
may properly be influenced by their prior personal relations,whether the other is a comparative stranger, or is a frequent colleague or an intimate friend; also, whether the question arises in
a large community, where his declining to participate would not
seriously preclude the plaintiff from procuring adequate legal service;
also, whether the particular service required is one which any
other equally competent lawyer could perform just as well. The
essential consideration is that the client's interest and the administration of justice will not materially suffer because he does not take
the case. If it obviously would he may not properly decline it
merely because he is loath to proceed against a fellow member of
the bar.
The second sentence of Canon 29 requires counsel in a case in
which perjury has been committed to bring this to the knowledge of
the prosecuting authorities, even, I believe, though such would seriously reflect on another lawyer in the case. Before doing this, however, he should be clear that perjury has in fact been committed,
should discuss the matter with his client, and should tell any
lawyer apparently responsible for the perjury what he proposes to
do, and hear his side of the matter. His further procedure might
depend on the disclosures in this interview but should not be influenced by his reluctance to injure a fellow-lawyer.
The third sentence, requiring the lawyer to guard the Bar against
the admission of those unfit morally or unqualified by education,
coupled with the last sentence requiring him to strive "at all times"
to uphold the honor and maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve the law and its administration, obviously require him
to cooperate in removing, at least from active practice, any whose
continuance in practice would normally impair this.
A lawyer retained to prosecute a claim for damages against another
lawyer has a peculiar obligation to do his best to bring about a proper
settlement and if he thinks well of defendant's character, reputation
and past practice, he can properly urge this in his favor, without, of
course, giving his client ground for belief that he is favoring defendant because a member of the bar.
Canon 28, entitled "Stirring up Litigation, Directly or through
Agents," after enumerating certain well known forms of soliciting
professional employment, characterized as "disreputable," provides:
A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the Bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any
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practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end that the offender
may be disbarred.

The use of the word "disbarred" in this provision would seem to indicate that the improper practices thus referred to were so serious
as to warrant disbarment, which is not invoked for minor offences
or for mere negligence. I believe that "knowledge" contemplates
exclusive or at least peculiar knowledge, and that the provisions
would not require the giving of unsolicited information as to notorious
practices, although it would be the duty of every lawyer to cooperate
fully with any bar committee charged with the investigation of such
practices.
While the provision of Canon 28 covers primarily only the solicitation of litigation and the deliberate promotion thereof, it impliedly
requires a lawyer to disclose any equally improper practices on the
part of other lawyers of which he has peculiar knowledge.
The affirmative duty of disclosure thus imposed on the lawyer may
well involve a greater embarrassment to him than that of merely
deciding when to accept a disagreeable case. Implanted in every
one, since childhood, is the conviction that it is ignoble to tell tales
on one's associates, and it is this which must be weighed against
the specific duty of disclosure imposed by the last sentence of Canon
28 and the first of Canon 29, which duty cannot be avoided on the
ground that the other's professional reputation may be injured
thereby.
A related question arises where a lawyer is asked to testify as
an expert witness as, for example, to the reasonableness of counsel
fees, or as to the amount of damage resulting from defendant's
professional delinquencies. Except, perhaps, at the request of a
judge, I see no reason why a lawyer should give expert testimony
if he wishes not to do so, unless perhaps in the rare case where it
is apparent that he is so peculiarly expert or informed in the particular matter that the lawyer requesting him to testify will be under
a serious handicap without him.
The solution of these problems related to participating in litigation
against a fellow lawyer depends in each case to a great extent on the
accompanying circumstances. Professional courtesy should not be
distorted or overemphasized merely to avoid a disagreeable or unremunerative assignment. On the other hand, a lawyer need not accept
such a retainer because of a quixotic notion of his obligation to the
bar where there is no cogent reason for his particular participation.
While close cases can, of course, be imagined, it is believed that a
lawyer with poise sufficient to prevent undue influence by his prejudices can in any actual case readily arrive at a correct solution.

